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1.  Introduction 
 
The rise in total spending by central and local governments was one of the most profound 
economic changes of the twentieth century (S.J. Evenett, 2000). This is consistent with Public 
Finance theory as propounded by Wagner and Baumol - an increase in GDP is accompanied by 
an increasing role of the state in maintaining law and order, providing essential services like 
education and health and contributing to other significant economic activities. This also means 
that the government in its various forms – central and sub-central as well as state-owned 
enterprises - spends a considerable sum of money on procuring goods and services in keeping 
with its growing responsibilities. Typically, figures for government procurement range from 10 
to 15 per cent of GDP across countries. A study by the OECD (2002) estimates that 
government procurement (inclusive of defence and compensation of employees) accounts for 
almost 20 per cent of GDP in OECD countries and between 9 and 20 per cent of GDP in 
developing countries. An immediate implication is that through procurement, the state has 
influence over the allocation of resources in market economies. Another interesting 
observation in this regard is the preponderance of domestic suppliers meeting the procurement 
requirements of governments throughout much of the post-World War II period, possibly 
suggesting the use of public procurement as a non-tariff barrier to trade.      
 
Minimizing procurement costs is not the only argument in the government’s objective function. 
Governments are also saddled with political economy considerations and other non-economic 
objectives like the promotion of domestic industry, encouraging the transfer of technology, 
promoting small, medium and artisan firms and state enterprises, and the promotion of national 
security. This means that goods and services may not always be bought from the most cost-
effective or efficient supplier, in effect making discrimination in public procurement inevitable. 
In fact, procurement literature has used the theory of auctions and asymmetric information to 
develop models that show that discrimination may be necessary to minimize average 
procurement costs2.     
 
                                                 
2 For instance see McAfee & McMillan (1989), Laffont & Tirole (1991), Rothenberg (1993), Branco (1994), 
Breton & Salmon (1995) and Chen (1995). 
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However, even if discrimination is an optimal policy outcome, the net welfare benefits are 
likely to be modest at best. Rather, the cost savings for procuring entities and greater profits for 
domestic firms that favouritism generates will be offset by increased average prices (Deltas and 
Evenett, 1997). In any case, the optimal discriminating mechanism is specific to the underlying 
conditions and even small deviations can eliminate any gains. On the other hand, studies have 
shown that cost savings through competitive bidding are in the range of 30% (Transparency 
International, 1997; World Bank, 1994).      
 
This argument in favour of non-discrimination is the cornerstone on which most disciplines on 
government procurement are formulated. These measures include efforts undertaken by the EC 
as a part of its internal market reform and deregulation programmes, disciplines already present 
and those being negotiated in various preferential trade agreements, and the non-binding 
proposals of the APEC and the UNCITRAL Model Law (United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law). Arguably, the most important of such initiatives has been the WTO’s 
plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).  
In this paper, we examine whether the GPA has been able to increase non-discriminatory 
procurement by looking at the pattern of public purchases in two countries – Japan and 
Switzerland – since the implementation of the Uruguay Round GPA (URGPA). The choice of 
countries in this analysis was primarily determined by data availability considerations. Both 
countries submitted detailed procurement data consistently since the URGPA, in a form that 
was amenable to the statistical analysis undertaken in this paper. But there were other 
considerations as well: both are large open services-intensive economies (services account for 
75% of GDP) and both have large governments, federal and sub-federal (average share of total 
government expenditure in GDP over 1996-2002 was almost 50% in Japan and 37% in 
Switzerland). 
Data on government procurement was assembled from these countries’ submission to the 
WTO’s Committee on Government Procurement. Shingal (2002) and Evenett and Shingal 
(2006) analyzed this data in the case of Japan and found that the compliance mechanisms of 
the GPA “failed to prevent reductions in foreign penetration to Japan's state procurement 
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markets3.” The analysis was undertaken for both goods and services contracts awarded up to 
1999 and concluded that “the proportion of total contracts awarded to foreigners in 1998 and 
1999 was lower than in 1990 and 1991. In the absence of these changes, the value of contracts 
awarded to foreign firms would have been approximately 25 percent higher in 1998 and 
19994.” In this paper, we build on this earlier work by developing new metrics, extending the 
period of analysis and focusing exclusively on services procurement. 
Our results indicate that, at least for these two countries, foreign market access in services 
procurement has not increased through the 1990s since the coming into effect of the GPA. In 
fact, the proportions of services contracts awarded to foreigners have declined over 1996/97-
2002/03 for both countries and in the absence of this decline, the value of services contracts 
awarded to foreign firms would have been more than 15 times higher in the case of Japan and 
nearly 68 times more in the case of Switzerland! We also find that for the same services 
categories, the Japanese government is not purchasing as much from abroad as it's private 
sector is importing from the rest of the world, a finding that further points to the home-bias in 
that government's public purchase decisions. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the GPA, including the scope of 
the Agreement and the availability of data that forms the basis of the analysis in the paper. 
Section 3 looks at the methodology employed while Section 4 analyzes the individual country 
procurement patterns of the two countries in our sample and discusses the evolution of 
counterfactuals over time and in comparison with the private sector. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  The GPA and foreign procurement of services 
 
2.1.  The background: The GPA is a plurilateral agreement that was first 
negotiated during the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1973-79) and came 
into effect on January 1, 1981. A 1987 Protocol amended the Tokyo Round Procurement Code 
and the new version entered into force on January 1, 1988. The GPA, as it stands today, was 
                                                 
3 Evenett and Shingal (2006), op.cit, pp1. 
4 Evenett and Shingal (2006), op.cit, pp1. 
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negotiated in parallel with the Uruguay Round of the GATT and came into effect on January 1, 
1996. The URGPA has 40 Contracting Parties as its signatories5. Article XIX: 5 of the GPA 
requires that all Contracting Parties report data on procurement by government entities to the 
Committee on Government Procurement. This data pertains to the value and the number of 
contracts awarded by government procuring entities to winning suppliers who bid for them 
through one of the three procurement practices outlined in the Agreement – open tendering, 
selective tendering and limited tendering. The GPA requires that only procurement above a 
certain threshold value be subject to international competitive bidding.  
 
2. 2. Scope and Coverage of the Agreement: The GPA does not apply to all 
government procurement undertaken by its Contracting Parties. The Annexes of the GPA 
outline government entities and purchases of goods and services that are potentially disciplined 
by the Agreement. The GPA applies only to entities6 listed in Appendix 1 of the Agreement. 
This contains five Annexes for each signatory. Annex 1 lists covered central government 
entities; Annex 2 lists sub-central government entities; and Annex 3 is a “catch-all” category 
that lists all other entities (such as utilities) that procure in accordance with the provisions of 
the GPA. Annex 4 lists covered services, and Annex 5 covered construction services. In 
addition, the URGPA’s requirement of international competitive bidding does not apply to all 
procurement by the covered entities. Coverage depends on whether the value of the 
procurement is at or above a certain threshold.  
 
Thresholds differ depending on the type of procurement and on the level of government 
making the purchase and are stated in terms of the IMF’s accounting unit, the SDR.  For Annex 
#1 central government entities, the threshold values are SDR 130,000 for procurement of goods 
and services and SDR 5 million for procurement of construction services. For Annex #2 sub-
                                                 
5 This list includes Canada, the European Community and its 27 constituents, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, 
Japan, Liechtenstein, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan and the United States. In 
addition, Albania, Armenia, China, Georgia, Jordan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Oman and Panama are 
in the process of negotiating their accession to the GPA. The list primarily comprises developed countries 
with Australia and New Zealand being notable exceptions; most developing and all LDCs have chosen not to 
be a part of the GPA. 
6 Interestingly, the term ‘entity’ is not defined anywhere in the GPA, thus reflecting the absence of consensus 
on what constitutes a public undertaking or entity as well as paving the way for discretion on the part of 
Contracting Parties in meeting their commitments under the Agreement. 
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central government entities, the thresholds are SDR 200,000 for goods and services, (except for 
the United States and Canada which apply a SDR 355,000 threshold) and SDR 5 million for 
construction services (with the exception of Japan and the South Korea, which apply a SDR 15 
million threshold). For Annex #3 entities, the threshold values are SDR 400,000 for goods and 
services (with the exception that the United States applies a US$ 250,000 threshold for 
federally owned utilities) and SDR 5 million for construction services (barring Japan and 
Korea, which apply a threshold of SDR 15 million). Additionally, the General Notes of 
individual signatories may specify higher thresholds for particular Contracting Parties in a bid 
to ensure reciprocity.7 Exceptions from the obligations of the Agreement are allowed for 
developing countries in certain situations outlined in Article V of the URGPA while general 
exceptions are contained in Article XXIII8.  
 
2. 3. Data and its availability: Statistics submitted by the signatories to the 
WTO Secretariat are the primary source of data. Article XIX: 5 of the GPA requires that 
Contracting Parties submit procurement-related data to the Committee on Government 
Procurement. Article XIX:5(a) of the URGPA requires the submission of information on the 
value of contracts awarded both above and below the threshold. Article XIX:5(b) requires data 
on procurement above the threshold to be classified by procuring entities and by goods and 
services according to the nationality of the winning supplier irrespective of whether the 
supplier is located in a Contracting Party to the GPA. Data also needs to be provided on the use 
of limited tendering practices broken down by entity and by categories of goods and services 
(Article XIX:5(c)) and on derogations from the principles of Most Favoured Nation and 
National Treatment (Article XIX:5(d)).  
 
Unfortunately, only half of the 40 Contracting Parties (Canada, EU-15, Japan, Norway, 
Switzerland, Hong Kong and the United States) have made statistical submissions since the 
                                                 
7 The threshold can be different for different participants in the bid as is the case with the US' commitments 
on the procurement of construction services by Annex 2 & 3 entities vis-a-vis Korean suppliers. The threshold 
specified for construction services for Annex 2 and 3 entities in the US’ government procurement 
commitments is SDR 5 million, but for Korean construction services and their suppliers, the US has set a 
higher threshold at SDR 15 million.  
8 According to this article, these measures should not be applied in a manner that would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where similar conditions prevail or a disguised 
restriction on international trade. 
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URGPA came into being (details provided in Annex Table 1)9 and with the exception of Hong 
Kong, these submissions have been made electronically since 1997.10 Even amongst these, 
there are significant differences, both in terms of what is included and how it is included, and 
the need for consistency, has thus determined the choice of sample countries for the analysis 
that follows.11 A point to note here is the seriousness with which Contracting Parties to the 
GPA have met their commitments under Article XIX: 5, with half of the membership not 
making any information at all available in this regard. In the absence of any enforcement 
mechanism related to data requirements or any punitive action/public censure for non-
submission, Contracting Parties seem not to have taken their responsibilities in this regard 
seriously. Submitting data on procurement is one of the best ways of ensuring transparency in 
public procurement and highlighting any break in trend in public purchase decisions that 
signals discrimination.  
 
One problem in making inter-temporal comparisons is that different procurement codes were 
applicable in different time periods and these necessitated different data requirements. For 
instance, the Tokyo Round procurement code did not require data to be reported on the value 
and number of contracts awarded under derogations to the GPA. Furthermore, prior to the 
Uruguay Round procurement code, the scope of the GPA was limited to goods alone and to 
those services that were incidental to the procurement of such goods. With the Uruguay Round, 
the scope of the GPA was expanded to explicitly incorporate services (including construction 
services) and as such, data from before 1996 refers to goods alone while that post-1996 
involves both goods and services. This imposes an additional challenge in the analysis of 
services procurement12.    
                                                 
9 Data on government procurement is also available for certain years from 1981 onwards for Austria, Sweden, 
Finland (before they became Members of the EC), Singapore, Israel, and the European Communities. One 
standard observation is that submissions were not as detailed in the 1980s as they have been since the 1990s. 
Moreover, since 1997, Hong Kong, Japan and Norway have submitted this data almost every year. 
10 The US and Switzerland did this for 1996 as well. 
11 For instance, Japan has not submitted data for the years 1994-96 and 2005. The US did not make a 
submission in 1992, 1994, 1995, 2003, 2004 or 2006. Switzerland has not provided data for the year 1992 and 
beyond 2003.  
12 As noted above, the GPA requires that Contracting Parties submit data on the number and value of 
contracts awarded both above and below the threshold. However, while the above threshold figures need to be 
classified as goods or services, below the threshold no breakdown is required. This means that it becomes 
difficult to examine how goods or services contracts awarded above threshold have changed as a proportion 
of total goods or total services contracts, as the case may be. 
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3.  Methodology 
 
Two major potential benefits for GPA signatories emanate from the transparency requirements 
and the competition that results in the tax-paying public receiving better value for money spent 
by the government on its procurement activities, and from an increase in market access 
consequent upon purchases by governments of other Contracting Parties. In what follows, we 
examine if the latter objective has been fulfilled by undertaking an economic analysis of the 
statistical submissions. The methodology essentially involves building counterfactuals, one 
against time, and the other against the private sector.    
 
For the purpose of these counterfactuals, we define the following metrics: 
• Value of above-threshold (AT) contracts as a proportion of all contracts  
• Value of contracts awarded to foreigners (FP) as a proportion of total above-
threshold contracts 
• Value of contracts awarded using non-limited tendering (Non-LT) methods as a 
proportion of total above-threshold contracts13  
 
These metrics give an idea of how governments might be using their procurement practices to 
restrict market access. Governments can, for instance, split contracts to keep them below 
thresholds and this would be reflected in the declining share of AT contracts in total 
procurement. Governments may also choose to award fewer contracts to foreign suppliers or to 
award them mostly by limited tendering methods, which would limit the size of procurement 
open to international competition. Thus, the value of contracts above threshold awarded using 
non-limited tendering methods would serve as a measure of international competition in 
procurement or an indicator of the volume of procurement subject to international competitive 
bidding (ICB). This would be a measure of the de jure openness in procurement markets. On 
the other hand, the value of contracts above threshold actually awarded to foreigners would 
measure the actual extent of foreign procurement (FP) and reflect the de facto openness in 
procurement markets.  
                                                 
13 Contract data is not further disaggregated into selective tendering procedures to enable additional 
counterfactual analysis by this metric. 
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 To develop the counterfactual against time, we calculate the potential value of contracts in 
period ‘t’ by multiplying the actual value of contracts in period ‘t’ by a metric in period ‘t-1.’ If 
the metric in period ‘t-1’ was greater than that in period ‘t,’ which would be the case with 
metrics that declined over time, the potential value would exceed the actual value and the 
difference can be read as the unrealized market access associated with that metric.  
 
We thus define: 
 
itititit ATfpfpUFP *)( 1 −= −  
where  
UFPit = Unrealized foreign market access in the “i”th service category in year “t”  
fpit-1 = Share of foreign procurement in above-threshold procurement in the “i”th service 
category in year “t-1”    
fpit = Share of foreign procurement in above-threshold procurement in the “i”th service 
category in year “t” 
ATit = Value of above-threshold procurement in the “i”th service category in year “t” 
 
And,  
 
itititit ATnonLTnonLTUICB *)( 1 −= −  
where  
UICBit = Unrealized internationally competitive bidding in the “i”th service category in year “t”  
nonLTit-1 = Share of non-limited tender contracts by value in above-threshold procurement in 
the “i”th service category in year “t-1”    
nonLTit = Share of non-limited tender contracts by value in above-threshold procurement in the 
“i”th service category in year “t” 
ATit = Value of above-threshold procurement in the “i”th service category in year “t” 
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One limitation of this methodology14, however, is that it holds as constant all other factors that 
may be responsible for a decline in the metrics. A change in domestic or foreign production 
structures, for instance, could lead to a re-orientation towards domestic suppliers. The change 
could also be dictated by macroeconomic factors such as a recession or by reasons of political 
economy such as governments being in an election cycle. If we could hold all these other 
factors constant, however, procurement would be characterized by declining metrics over time 
only if governments chose to restrict market access on purpose; constancy or an increase in 
these metrics on the other hand would therefore suggest that the converse was true. Since we 
cannot make such corrections, our results must be considered more as suggestive than 
conclusive and one would need empirical analysis to investigate the determinants of 
governments’ procurement decisions. Thus, it may well be the case that the potential role of the 
GPA in increasing or even sustaining foreign market access may be limited even if 
commitments are taken seriously and foreign firms also maintain their interest in the market 
over time. This said, as we shall see below, the counterfactuals from our analyses are large 
enough in magnitude to suggest that the disciplines of the GPA have not been a binding 
constraint in ensuring non-discrimination in the award of services contracts. 
 
Another way of illustrating any home-bias in government procurement is by comparing import 
intensities in the public and private sectors for the same services categories. The theoretical 
justification for this comparison is provided by Baldwin (1970, 1984) who shows that in a 
Hecksher-Ohlin model with a home-bias in government procurement, the reduction in imports 
from the government is compensated by a corresponding increase in the imports of the private 
sector15. For the second counterfactual, therefore, the comparator used is the private sector and 
the intuition also involves simulating the effect of private-sector decision-making in public 
                                                 
14 Another implicit assumption in this methodology is with respect to the choice of the base period. Given that 
our methodology attempts to carry out an ex-post impact assessment of the GPA in terms of market access, 
the base period should ideally predate the coming into effect of the GPA. However, since we only consider 
market access in services in this paper and the coverage of services in the GPA only began with the URGPA, 
the second best alternative is to consider as base a period just after the URGPA came into effect as market 
access in this initial period is unlikely to be affected by the disciplining mechanisms of the GPA. The use of 
our methodology is thus also based on the premise that by the later years of our sample period, the 
disciplining mechanisms of the GPA would have had a positive impact on market access in services 
procurement.     
15 Miyagawa (1991) extends Baldwin’s “neutrality proposition” to an oligopolistic model.   
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purchase decisions. Given that private sector efficiency is a benchmark for most governments, 
such a comparison becomes further appropriate.  
 
While constructing this counterfactual, we assume that all other variables that have a bearing 
on public and private purchase decisions remain constant or affect these decisions identically. 
We simulate the effect of private-sector decision-making in public procurement decisions by 
using private sector import intensities in the share of total government procurement in each 
service category which is above-threshold and hence, potentially subject to ICB. This provides 
an estimate of the "foreign procurement" in each service category which would have been 
"undertaken" by the private sector had it been making government procuring decisions. From 
this we subtract the actual value of the foreign procurement undertaken by the government in 
each service category to get the size of the differential, which is termed as the Private-Public 
Purchase Differential (PPPD). 
 
We thus define: 
 
itt
i
it
it
it
it FPocTot
AT
AT
od
MPPPD −
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∑ Pr**Pr  
 
where  
PPPDit = Private-public purchase differential in the “i”th service category in year “t” 
(M/Prod)it = Ratio of imports to gross output in the “i”th service category in year “t”    
TotProct = Value of total procurement in year “t” 
ATit = Value of above-threshold procurement in the “i”th service category in year “t”     
∑ATit = Value of total above-threshold procurement in year “t” 
FPit = Value of foreign procurement in the “i”th service category in year “t” 
 
A positive PPPD in any service category implies that private sector imports in that service 
category exceed the amount of foreign procurement in it, which suggests a home-bias in 
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government procurement. A negative PPPD on the other hand suggests that the converse may 
be true.    
 
4. Analyses of Country Services Procurement Patterns 
 
Figure 1 provides a snapshot of the procurement patterns in Japan and Switzerland over the 
period 1997-2003. The AT/Total (above- & below-threshold) procurement shares are low in 
both countries (averaging 33% in Japan and 27.5% in Switzerland), which, prima facie, 
constricts the contestable procurement market in both countries. While these shares have fallen 
over time in Japan, Switzerland shows more fluctuations and a virtual reversion in 2003 to the 
1997 share. Focusing on services procured above threshold, these average more than 60% of 
total AT procurement in both countries and these shares have also risen over time. However as 
a share of total above- & below-threshold procurement, the shares of services procured above 
threshold are much lower in both countries and less than 20% in the case of Switzerland. The 
shares of Non-LT in AT services procurement have been high in both countries, averaging 
70% in Japan and 80% in Switzerland, but these have also fallen over time in both countries, 
and more considerably in the case of Switzerland from 86 to 68%. Thus, for both these 
countries, prima facie, the share of the market open to unimpeded international competition has 
shrunk. The share of foreign procurement in AT services procurement has been very low in 
Japan, averaging 1.4% over 1997-2003, and relatively higher in Switzerland with an average of 
4.4% over 1997-2002, without showing huge fluctuations around this mean. However, the 
Swiss share jumped to 33.4% in 2003 as several high value contracts were awarded to foreign 
firms in technical, scientific and consulting services (category 14), a single category that 
accounts for more than half of all services procured above-threshold by Switzerland. In fact, if 
we exclude this category, then the share of foreign procurement in services purchased by Swiss 
central government entities would be close to the 4.4% mean again. Unfortunately, 2003 is the 
last year for which data on government procurement is available in the case of Switzerland and 
it is therefore not possible to know if it signals a change in the trend of Swiss services 
procurement. We therefore regard the year as an outlier in our statistical analyses of Swiss 
services procurement.  
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Figure 1: A Snapshot of Country Procurement Patterns 
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Source: WTO, Committee on Government Procurement; own calculations 
 
4.1.  Japanese services procurement  
 
We begin by looking at Japanese submissions on services procurement averaged over 1997-98 
and 2002-03 and compare both the percentage number and value of contracts awarded to 
foreign firms as well as those awarded using non-limited tendering methods during these 
periods in Tables 1 and 2. We consider all services, including construction, included by Japan 
in Annexes 4 and 5 of Appendix 1 of the GPA; the list is provided in Annex Table 2 of this 
paper. 
 
Table 1 reports for 1997-98 and for 2002-03 the average number of services contracts that were 
awarded above-the-threshold, the number of these contracts that were awarded to foreign 
bidders, and the number of above-the-threshold contracts where limited tendering procedures 
were not used. Columns VIII and IX of this table report the proportion of contracts awarded to 
foreigners in 1997-98, 2002-03 and columns XI and XII report the proportion of contracts 
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awarded in the same years without resort to limited tendering procedures. Finally, Columns X 
and XIII, respectively, report the results from statistically testing for each service category if 
the proportion of contracts awarded to foreigners in 1997-98 was the same as that in 2002-03 
and if the proportion of above-the-threshold contracts that did not involve the use of limited 
tendering in 1997-98 was the same as that in 2002-0316. While carrying out these tests, we 
weighted the proportions for each service category in the two time periods by the share of that 
category in the total value of contracts awarded in the respective time periods. Weighting the 
contract numbers by their values in this way becomes necessary because, as we shall see 
below, procurement in certain services dominates total above-threshold services procurement 
in these two countries.    
 
In 1997-98, there were, on average, 2180.5 services contracts awarded above the threshold, of 
which 3.4% were awarded to foreign firms. Sixty per cent of these contracts did not involve the 
use of limited tendering procedures. In 2002-03, the average number of contracts had risen to 
3007.5, the percentage awarded to foreigners had fallen marginally to 3.2%, and the percentage 
of these contracts that did not employ limited tendering was lower at 58%. Ceteris paribus, 
these findings are not indicative of greater foreign access to Japanese services procurement. 
However, the test statistic in the bottom line of Table 1 under column X takes the value of 
0.69, thereby failing to reject the hypothesis that the true probability of a contract being 
awarded to a foreign firm was no lower in 2002-03 than in 1997-98. Having said that, column 
X of Table 1 reveals that at least one services category (41, which is construction services), 
saw statistically significant reductions in the proportion of contracts awarded to foreign firms 
(albeit at the 10% level) and this category accounted for 18.6% of all services contracts 
awarded by number and 78% of all services contracts awarded by value during 2002-03.  
 
The final column of Table 1 reports the test statistic for the maximum proportion of purchases 
in each services category that are subject to internationally competitive bidding. Once again, in 
                                                 
16 Formally, a one tail test is being performed here on two computed proportions. The null hypothesis is that 
the true value of the proportions for 1997 and 1998 and for 2002 and 2003 are equal. The alternative 
hypothesis is that the former exceeds the latter. The test statistic takes account of the fact that in neither case 
is the true value of the proportion observed. Value of the test statistic, which is normally distributed, above 
1.645 (1.282) indicates that there is a 95 (90) percent or more chance that in fact the true proportion in 2002-
03 is smaller than in 1997-98. 
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the case of construction services, the value of the test statistic exceeds 1.645, thereby indicating 
a 95 percent or greater chance that in fact the true proportion of contracts awarded using non-
LT methods in 2002-03 is smaller than in 1997-98. On the whole, as well, the finding in the 
bottom row of the final column of Table 1 supports the contention that the proportion of above-
the-threshold procurement contracts in Japan by number subject to internationally competitive 
bidding fell over time at the 10% significance level (but not at the 5% level). 
Table 1: Japanese services contracts by number
 
 
           Note: (1) “np” denotes no AT procurement (2) Values exceeding 1.645 in columns X and XIII denote rejection of the null hypothesis (non-decline in foreign  
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII
Services Avg. 1997-98 Avg. 2002-03 Avg. 1997-98 Avg. 2002-03
Category AT Foreigners Non-LT AT Foreigners Non-LT FP(%) FP(%) Test statistic ICB(%) ICB(%) Test statistic
41 552.5 3 448.5 559 0.5 449.5 0.5 0.1 1.61 81.2 80.4 3.12
42 14.5 0 3 53 0 15.5 0.0 0.0 20.7 29.2 -0.01
51 0.5 0 0.5 6 0 5.5 0.0 0.0 100.0 91.7 -0.06
52 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 np 0.0 np
53 34 0 4.5 54.5 0 16.5 0.0 0.0 13.2 30.3 -0.01
54 14 0 14 7 0 7 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
55 0 0 0 0 0 0 np np np np
56 2 0 1 14.5 1 9 0.0 6.9 0.00 50.0 62.1 0.00
57 8 0 6 26.5 0 9 0.0 0.0 75.0 34.0 0.00
58 0 0 0 0 0 0 np np np np
61 0 0 0 3.5 0 1.5 np 0.0 np 42.9
62 0 0 0 1 0 1 np 0.0 np 100.0
63 10 2 0 20 4 2 20.0 20.0 0.00 0.0 10.0 0.00
64 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
65 2 0 1 5 0 0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.00
66 0 0 0 0 0 0 np np np np
67 7.5 0.5 0 33 2 15 6.7 6.1 0.00 0.0 45.5 -0.03
71 766 65 303 1370.5 83.5 548.5 8.5 6.1 0.05 39.6 40.0 -1.07
72 3.5 0 2.5 13.5 1 5.5 0.0 7.4 0.00 71.4 40.7 0.00
73 220 2.5 34.5 136.5 1.5 48 1.1 1.1 0.00 15.7 35.2 -0.06
74 29 0 28.5 79 0 75.5 0.0 0.0 98.3 95.6 0.01
75 261 0 245.5 335 0 324.5 0.0 0.0 94.1 96.9 -0.07
76 60 0 50 108 0 92 0.0 0.0 83.3 85.2 -0.05
77 148.5 2 116.5 114 2.5 69.5 1.3 2.2 0.00 78.5 61.0 0.05
78 46.5 0 42.5 67.5 0 58.5 0.0 0.0 91.4 86.7 -0.02
Total 2180.5 75 1301.5 3007.5 96 1753.5 3.4 3.2 0.69 59.7 58.3 1.42
~~~~Avg. 1997-98~~~~~ ~~~~Avg. 2002-03~~~~
 
           procurement and use of non-LT over time) at the 5% level of significance (3) Data is averaged over 1997-98 and 2002-03 
Source: WTO, Committee on Government Procurement; own calculations 
Looking next at contract values (averaged over 1997-98 and 2002-03 and expressed in real 
terms using the US GDP Implicit Price Deflator) in Table 2, we see that Japanese services 
procurement fell by roughly 25% from USD 14.8 bn to USD 11 bn over 1997-8, 2002-3. The 
share of foreign procurement dropped from 1.3 to 1.1%, while the use of non-limited tendering 
fell from 71.3 to 69.4%. Construction, followed by computer-related services, dominates 
services procurement in Japan, together accounting for 95% of all services contracts in value, 
but the average above-threshold values for both these services fell over time. Further, fewer of 
these services were awarded to foreign suppliers in 2002-03 than in 1997-98. On the other 
hand, the use of non-limited tendering increased slightly in the case of construction services 
but declined sharply for computer-related services, suggesting a net constriction in the market 
open to international competition. 
Table 2: Japanese services contracts by value
 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
(Value real USD mn)
Services categories AT FP (% ) ICB (% ) AT FP (% ) ICB (% ) UFP UICB
41 12430.3 0.4 76.9 8638.4 0.0 81.3 2799.7 -37834.9
42 106.2 0.0 3.2 82.0 0.0 17.7 0.0 -1196.2
51 0.2 0.0 100.0 60.8 0.0 99.8 0.0 9.7
52 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 np np
53 26.0 0.0 15.6 37.9 0.0 28.5 0.0 -490.0
54 19.8 0.0 100.0 8.9 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
55 0.0 np np 0.0 np np
56 1.0 0.0 50.3 11.4 6.4 72.3 -73.3 -252.0
57 6.2 0.0 68.8 19.4 0.0 48.9 0.0 386.3
58 0.0 np np 0.0 np np
61 0.0 100.0 100.0 1.7 0.0 49.7 165.5 83.2
62 0.0 np np 0.4 0.0 100.0
63 5.8 22.2 0.0 9.3 10.2 3.1 112.3 -28.7
64 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 -256.9 0.0 82.3
65 0.7 0.0 45.3 1.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 56.7
66 0.0 np np 0.0 np np
67 8.5 9.8 -12.8 41.6 9.5 14.7 13.2 -1141.2
71 1811.0 8.1 40.2 1797.7 6.3 16.6 3182.3 42354.0
72 1.5 0.0 79.6 9.9 3.5 16.8 -34.3 619.8
73 135.7 0.3 13.5 104.5 1.2 36.5 -97.6 -2399.9
74 24.3 0.0 99.3 17.1 0.0 94.4 0.0 84.2
75 135.3 0.0 94.8 108.4 0.0 92.8 0.0 220.0
76 26.2 0.0 82.7 45.4 0.0 82.5 0.0 10.6
77 102.6 2.2 69.1 60.1 4.6 57.5 -143.7 696.2
78 13.0 0.0 72.4 20.3 0.0 83.8 0.0 -231.2
Total 14854.8 1.3 71.3 11076.9 1.1 69.4 1960.8 21303.3
~~~~~~Avg. 1997-98~~~~~~ ~~~~~~Avg. 2002-03~~~~~~
 
 
Source: WTO, Committee on Government Procurement; own calculations 
Note: (1) “np” denotes no AT procurement (2) Categories 41 and 71 reported large-value contracts  
(3) Data is averaged over 1997-98 and 2002-03 (4) Contract values in SDR converted to real US dollar 
using the SDR-USD exchange rate and the US GDP Implicit Price Deflator 
 
These declining metrics together translate into an unrealized foreign market access of USD 
1.96 bn and a UICB worth USD 21.3 bn (reported in columns VIII and IX of Table 2). These 
are hugely significant magnitudes - for instance, had the shares of foreigner-won and non-LT-
awarded contracts in above-threshold contracts by value not declined over time, foreign 
services procurement in 2002-03 would have been more than 15 times higher (ratio of total 
UFP to total actual FP in 2002-03) and the value of contracts open to ICB would have been 
almost three times larger (ratio of total UICB to total actual ICB in 2002-03). 
 
4.2.   Swiss services procurement  
 
In the case of Switzerland, considering the year 2003 to be a statistical outlier, we conduct 
analogous analyses comparing Swiss submissions on services procurement averaged over 
1996-97 and 2001-02. Data on Swiss contracts numbers is reported in Table 3 and on contracts 
value in Table 4. We consider both non-construction (categories 1-18) and construction 
(categories 1-8) services included by Switzerland in Annexes 4 and 5 of Appendix 1 of the 
GPA; the list is provided in Annex Table 3 of this paper. 
 
From Table 3 we see that in 1996-97, there were 264.5 services contracts awarded on average 
by the Swiss above threshold, of which 9.3% were awarded to foreign firms. 66.7% of these 
contracts did not involve the use of limited tendering procedures. In 2001-02, the average 
number of contracts had risen to 352.5, but the percentage awarded to foreigners had fallen to 
4.5%, and the percentage of these contracts that did not employ limited tendering was also 
marginally lower at 66.5%. Ceteris paribus, therefore, a la Japan, these findings are not 
indicative of greater foreign access to Swiss services procurement.  
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Supporting this contention, the test statistic (calculated once again by weighting the contract 
numbers by their respective values as in the case of Japan) in the bottom line under column X 
of Table 3 takes the value of 3.18, thereby suggesting that the true proportion of contracts 
awarded to foreign firms was lower in 2001-02 than in 1996-97 (the same result holds true for 
total non-construction services). On the other hand, the test statistic in the bottom line of 
column XIII does not point to statistically significant reductions in the proportion of above 
threshold contacts awarded using non-LT methods, though category 14 (consulting and 
technical services) and non-construction services on the whole do actually suggest such 
reductions (at the 5 and 10% levels of significance, respectively).      
Table 3: Swiss services contracts by number
 
 
Note: (1) “np” denotes no AT procurement (2) Values exceeding 1.645 in columns X and XIII denote rejection of the null hypothesis (non-decline in foreign  
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII
Avg. 1996-97 Avg. 2001-02 Avg. 1996-97 Avg. 2001-02
Categories AT Foreigners Non-LT AT Foreigners Non-LT FP (%) FP (%) Test statistic ICB (%) ICB (%) Test statistic
1 34 0.5 12.5 30.5 0.5 15.5 1.5 1.6 0.02 36.8 50.8 0.08
2 9 2.5 8.5 1 0 0.5 27.8 0.0 0.12 94.4 50.0 0.12
3 1.5 0.5 1.5 0 0 -1 33.3 0.0 100.0 0.0
4 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5 0.5 0 0.5 2.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 20.0 -0.01 100.0 20.0 -0.01
6 0 0 0 0 0 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
7 33 0.5 20.5 95.5 4 58.5 1.5 4.2 -0.20 62.1 61.3 -0.49
8 0 0 0 1.5 0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
9 1.5 0 1.5 5 0 3 0.0 0.0 100.0 60.0 0.06
10 5 0.5 1 10 0.5 2.5 10.0 5.0 0.00 20.0 25.0 -0.01
11 14.5 2.5 9.5 0 0 0 17.2 0.0 65.5 0.0
12 14 1 0.5 20.5 1 16 7.1 4.9 -0.18 3.6 78.0 -2.44
13 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
14 119 11 88 132.5 8.5 96.5 9.2 6.4 1.23 73.9 72.8 3.93
15 1.5 0 1.5 10.5 0 2.5 0.0 0.0 100.0 23.8 -0.03
16 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
17 0 0 0 5.5 0.5 4 0.0 9.1 0.0 72.7
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non-construction 234 19 146 317 15.5 199 8.1 4.9 2.20 62.4 62.8 1.49
1 7.5 0 7.5 4 0 4 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
2 5 5 5 11 0.5 11 100.0 4.5 0.30 100.0 100.0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5 2 0.5 2 0 0 0 25.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
6 8 0 8 5 0 5 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
7 8 0 8 3 0 3 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
8 0 0 0 12.5 0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Construction 30.5 5.5 30.5 35.5 0.5 35.5 18.0 1.4 0.22 100.0 100.0
All services 264.5 24.5 176.5 352.5 16 234.5 9.3 4.5 3.18 66.7 66.5 0.07
~~~~Avg. 1996-97~~~~ ~~~~Avg. 2001-02~~~~
 
procurement and use of non-LT over time) at the 5% level of significance (3) Data is averaged over 1996-97 and 2001-02                          
Source: WTO, Committee on Government Procurement; own calculations 
In terms of contract values reported in Table 4 (averaged over 1996-97 and 2001-02 and 
expressed in real terms using the US GDP Implicit Price Deflator), average Swiss services 
procurement (excluding that in construction) rose by nearly half from USD 204 mn to USD 
305 mn over 1996-7, 2001-2, while construction services witnessed a more than three-fold 
increase from USD 16.5 mn to USD 53.9 mn. Within non-construction services, the share of 
foreign procurement in services fell from 5.2 to 4% while the use of non-limited tendering fell 
marginally from 78 to 77.5%. Construction services, driven primarily by general building 
construction work (category 2), witnessed a huge fall in foreign procurement from 23.3 to 
3.6%. Data also suggests that the Swiss government did not resort to limited tendering 
practices in the award of construction services contracts. On the whole, the share of foreign 
procurement in services fell from 6.6 to 3.9% while the use of non-limited tendering increased 
from 80 to 81%. Technical, scientific and consulting services (categories 12 and 14), followed 
by computer-related (category 7), construction and repair services (category 1), dominate 
Swiss services procurement, accounting for more than 90% of all services contracts in value 
terms, and barring repair services (category 1), the average above-threshold procurement for 
the other major categories increased over time. Foreign procurement share in these services fell 
sharply for technical, scientific and consulting (category 12) and construction services while 
the use of non-limited tendering fell in the case of technical, scientific and consulting services 
(category 14).  
 
The results from counterfactual analysis in the case of Swiss services procurement, reported in 
Columns VIII and IX of Table 4, translate into an unrealized foreign market access of USD 
953 mn, a value that is even more significant in terms of magnitude than the comparable figure 
for Japan - had the shares of foreigner-won above-threshold contracts by value not declined 
over time, foreign services procurement in 2001-02 would have been nearly 68 times higher 
(ratio of total actual UFP to total actual FP in 2001-02)! On the other hand, UICB is -418.5 mn, 
which suggests that the de jure openness increased. However, this result emanates from the 
Swiss government's non-use of limited tendering in awarding construction services contracts. If 
we consider only non-construction services, UICB is USD 176.5 mn - the value of non-
construction services contracts open to ICB would have been 75% more (ratio of total actual 
UICB in non-construction to total actual ICB in non-construction in 2001-02) had the use of 
non-LT in these services not declined over 1996-97, 2001-02.    
 
Table 4: Swiss services contracts by value
 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
(Value real USD mn)
Categories AT FP (%) ICB (%) AT FP (%) ICB (%) UFP UICB
1 20.7 0.5 12.8 19.6 3.1 44.8 -50.6 -627.2
2 9.8 7.8 95.8 0.3 0.0 50.6 2.0 11.7
3 1.5 6.1 100.0 0.0 np np
4 0.0 np np 0.0 np np
5 0.1 0.0 100.0 2.8 4.2 -56.7 -12.0 445.8
6 0.0 np np 0.0 np np
7 15.2 0.7 46.8 44.9 8.8 61.7 -366.7 -665.8
8 0.0 np np 0.3 0.0 100.0
9 3.4 0.0 100.0 3.2 0.0 86.0 0.0 45.4
10 1.4 7.4 13.9 4.4 13.5 45.4 -27.2 -138.8
11 20.5 19.6 76.2 0.0 np np
12 1.6 82.6 56.4 82.5 0.7 98.8 6755.2 -3498.1
13 0.0 np np 0.7 0.0 -12.9
14 129.5 3.2 91.2 137.4 4.5 84.3 -175.3 950.4
15 0.4 0.0 100.0 6.8 0.0 3.0 0.0 656.6
16 0.2 0.0 100.0 0.1 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
17 0.0 np np 2.0 6.8 74.2
18 0.0 np np 0.0 np np
Total non-construction 204.4 5.2 78.1 305.1 4.0 77.5 379.5 176.5
1 0.6 0.0 100.0 19.1 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
2 3.7 100.0 100.0 27.2 7.1 100.0 2528.0 0.0
3 0.0 np np 0.0 np np
4 0.0 np np 0.0 np np
5 4.3 3.8 100.0 0.0 np np
6 2.0 0.0 100.0 1.9 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
7 5.8 0.0 100.0 0.3 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
8 0.0 np np 5.4 0.0 100.0
Total construction 16.5 23.3 100.0 53.9 3.6 100.0 1065.7 noLT
All services 220.8 6.6 79.7 359.0 3.9 80.9 953.1 -418.5
~~~~Avg. 1996-97~~~~ ~~~~Avg. 2001-02~~~~
 
 
Source: WTO, Committee on Government Procurement; own calculations 
           Note: (1) “np” denotes no AT procurement and “no LT” denotes non-use of limited tendering  
             (2) Categories 1, 7, 12 and 14 among non-construction and categories 1and 2 among construction  
           services reported large-value contracts (3) Data is averaged over 1996-97 and 2001-02  
             (4) Contract values in SDR converted to real US dollar using the SDR-USD exchange rate and the 
           US GDP Implicit Price Deflator 
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4.3. Private-public purchase differentials 
 
Finally, results from the counterfactual analysis against the private sector for both Japan and 
Switzerland are reported in Table 5. Data on sectoral output and imports for the two countries 
is taken from the OECD's STAN database for structural analysis and trade in services by 
service category, respectively. Unfortunately, sector-specific data on imports and gross output 
is not available for all services categories; hence, the individual services categories for the two 
countries have been aggregated into broader categories (the composition is shown in brackets 
against each category in Table 5) to enable better analysis. Even then, the absence of import 
data for Swiss construction and computer-related services over our sample period meant that 
the counterfactuals even for these broad categories could not be calculated in the case of 
Switzerland.     
Table 5: Private-public purchase differentials
 
Categories  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Construction (41) 149.0 292.9 123.2 122.3 118.8 149.6 147.7
Other business (42, 72-73, 75-78)  33.3 57.6 25.5 25.5 30.7 24.7 31.8
Transportation (53-57) 10.4 14.3 9.3 14.9 16.2 21.4 22.0
Communication (58, 61-65) -0.6 -1.5 -1.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -0.8
Computer-related (66-67, 71) 132.9 -12.5 1.0 5.7 1.4 -33.6 -22.5
Total 325.0 350.7 157.7 168.3 166.8 161.5 178.1
Categories  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Transportation (2-4) 9.0 3.1 1.9 1.8 0.0 0.2 0.8
Communication (5) 0.05 1.1 1.2 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5
Financial (6) 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other business (1, 8-18) -4.2 -8.3 -7.6 -7.7 -9.1 -4.2 -129.0
Total 4.8 -4.0 -4.5 -5.5 -8.7 -3.4 -127.7
Switzerland (values in real USD mn)
Japan (values in real USD mn)
 
 
Source: WTO, Committee on Government Procurement; OECD Stats Online; own calculations  
Note: (1) Import data was not available for construction and computer-related services in the case of 
Switzerland; hence, the counterfactuals are missing for these categories (2) Financial services are not included 
by Japan in Annexes 4 and 5 of Appendix 1 of the GPA (3) The numbers in brackets against each broad 
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category indicate the individual services categories listed in Annex Tables 2 and 3 that were aggregated to 
form that broad category   
 
Table 5 reveals that Japanese services in these categories, primarily construction, have seen 
large private-public purchase differentials over time, a finding that is consistent with Baldwin's 
(1970, 1984) "neutrality proposition" and the home-bias in Japanese services procurement. The 
differentials were USD 325 mn in 1997 but declined to USD 178 mn in 2003 largely on 
account of rising public purchase of computer-related services from foreign suppliers, a 
category which therefore showed negative differentials in 1998, 2002 and 2003. The 
differentials were always positive in the case of construction, other business and transportation 
services and also showed a more than two-fold increase for transportation services. Thus, had 
the private sector been making government procurement decisions in these services, they 
would have purchased more from foreign suppliers than the government actually did. 
Communication services, on the other hand, always report a negative differential, which 
suggests that the Japanese government may not have been favouring domestic firms in the 
purchase of these services.  
 
Absence of comparable data for a broader range of Swiss services renders a similar analysis 
more suggestive than conclusive. Swiss services see a positive but declining differential for 
transportation services (suggesting reduced importance of the home-bias), a zero differential 
for financial services (absence of above-threshold procurement) except in 1999 when the 
differential was positive (suggesting a home-bias) and a positive and nearly constant 
differential for communication services over 2000-03 (suggesting no change over time in the 
importance of the home-bias). The differential for other business services is always negative 
(suggesting no home-bias) but jumps to USD -129 mn in 2003, a result that supports the choice 
of this year as a statistical outlier in the case of Switzerland.   
 
On the whole, results from this counterfactual analysis suggest that at least the Japanese 
government has not been purchasing as much from abroad as it’s private sector is importing 
from the rest of the world for the same services categories. These results are thus consistent 
with those from the preceding analyses on the home-bias in Japanese services procurement 
patterns. 
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5.           Conclusion 
 
The results from the analyses undertaken in this paper suggest that the URGPA has not really 
been effective in increasing or even sustaining market access for foreigners in the procurement 
markets of two of its signatories – Japan and Switzerland. We have examined data from two of 
the 40 Contracting Parties to the GPA that have submitted detailed data in a form amenable to 
our statistical analysis; hence, the results are specific to these countries. This said, the results 
can be generalized to the extent that they point in the same direction, suggesting a home-bias in 
the award of government services contracts. 
 
A careful reading of the results further suggests that this may be due to a combination of 
incomplete/ineffective provisions and a weak enforcement mechanism. For instance, despite 
the requirements of Article XIX:5, only half of the 40 Contracting Parties have submitted 
procurement data consistently over time to the WTO, which points to weak enforcement and in 
turn, could be due to the absence of any punitive action or public censure for non-submission. 
This said, one needs to exercise some restraint in the interpretation of the results in this paper 
given that at least one of the countries studied (Japan) underwent stagnation and recession for 
much of the period since the Uruguay Round and this may have influenced that government’s 
procurement decisions. Even so, there is enough argument for addressing the loopholes in the 
GPA (too many exclusions/exemptions allowed; non-price discrimination is allowed while 
more efficient price preferences are explicitly banned) and for giving it more teeth (public 
censure for non-adherence to data reporting commitments; provision of incentives to whistle-
blowers revealing corruption in procurement). The WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
could also work through peer-pressure by highlighting non-compliance with Article XIX: 5 
and/or pointing out distinct breaks in past patterns of public procurement that signal a move 
towards discrimination.   
 
Finally, while the evidence reported in this paper may be more suggestive, the finding that the 
GPA did not increase ex-post foreign market access in services in these two governments’ 
public purchases is undeniably conclusive. Furthermore, if this result were repeated all over, 
then it must reflect home biases in government procurement because not every country can 
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have greater efficiency at home. The analysis in this paper is thus similar to the analyses 
examining residuals from gravity models to illustrate protection in goods markets. In a similar 
vein, our results do suggest discrimination against foreign suppliers in the government 
procurement markets for services in these two countries.      
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Annex Table 1: Statistical submissions made to the Committee on 
Government Procurement
 
Year Reporting Countries 
2009 Hong Kong, Norway 
2008 Hong Kong, Japan, Norway & USA 
2007 Hong Kong, Japan, Norway & USA 
2006 Hong Kong, Japan, Norway 
2005 Hong Kong, Norway & USA 
2004 Hong Kong, Japan 
2003 Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway & Switzerland 
2002 Canada, EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Norway & Switzerland & USA 
2001 Canada, EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway & Switzerland & USA 
2000 Canada, EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway & Switzerland & USA  
1999 Canada, EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway, Switzerland & USA  
1998 Canada, EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway, Switzerland & USA  
1997 Canada, EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway, Switzerland & USA  
1996 Canada, EC, Norway, Switzerland & USA  
1995 Hong Kong, Norway & Switzerland 
1994 Austria, Finland, Hong Kong, Norway, Singapore, Sweden & Switzerland 
1993 
Austria, Canada, Finland, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland & 
USA 
1992 
Austria, Canada, EC, Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Sweden & 
USA 
1991 
Austria, Canada, Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, 
Switzerland & USA 
1990 
Austria, Canada, EC, Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, 
Switzerland & USA 
1989 Canada, Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland & USA 
1988 Canada, Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland & USA  
1987 Canada, Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland & USA  
1986 Canada, Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland & USA  
1985 Austria, Canada, EC, Finland, Israel, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Sweden & Switzerland  
 
Source: WTO, Statistical submissions made to the Committee on Government Procurement, 1985-2009 
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Annex Table 2: List of services procured by the Japanese
 
Japanese Classification CPC Code Services Category
41 51 Construction work
42 867 Architectural, engineering & other technical 
51 6112 Maintenance & repair  (motor vehicles)
52 6122 Maintenance & repair (motorcycles & snowmobiles)
53 712 Other land transport  
54 7213 Rental (sea-going vessels)
55 7223 Rental (non-sea-going vessels)
56 73 Air transport 
57 748 Freight transport agency 
58 7512 Courier 
61 7523 Electronic mail
62 7521 Voice mail
63 7523 On-line info & database retrieval
64 7523 Electronic data interchange (EDI)
65 7529 Enhanced fax 
66 7523 Code and protocol conversion
67 7523 On-line info &/or data processing 
71 84 Computer & related 
72 864 Market research & pub opinion polling 
73 871 Advertising 
74 87304 Armoured car 
75 874 Building-cleaning 
76 88442 Publishing & printing  
77 886 Repair (metal products & machinery)
78 94 Sewage & refuse disposal, sanitation & other EP  
 
Source: WTO, Committee on Government Procurement; GATS, Central Product Classification 
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Annex Table 3: List of services procured by the Swiss
 
Swiss 
Classification CPC Services Descriptions 
1 6112, 6122, 633, 886 Discussion to the wide direction (discussion, inspection, repairs) 
2 
712 (excd. 71235), 7512, 87304 
Land transportation, including the transportation of money and the 
mail services, except the postal traffic and rail transportation 
3 
73 (excd. 7321) 
Air transportation: Transportation of travellers and of 
merchandise, except the transportation of courier 
4 
71235, 7321 
Transportation of mail by land or by airplane (except rail 
transportation) 
5 
752 (excd. 7524, 7525, 7526) 
Telecommunications (except the services of vocal telephony, of 
telex, of radio telephony, of radio-messaging and of 
telecommunications by satellite) 
6 
811, 812, 814 
Services regarding assurance and bank services, except the 
financial services relating to the transmission, to the sale, to the 
purchase or to the transfer of titles or of other financial 
instruments, as well as services furnished by central banks 
7 84 Computer and related services  
8 862 Accounting, auditing and book-keeping services 
9 864 Market and public-opinion polling services 
10 865, 866 Management consulting and related services 
11 867 Architecture, urban installation and environmental architecture 
12 
867 
Consulting and technical services, technical integrated services, 
relevant scientific and technical consulting, technical essays and 
analyses of construction projects 
13 
867 
Works of study (auction of identical markets to several contractors 
to obtain different suggestions of solutions) 
14 
867 
Consulting and technical services, technical integrated services, 
relevant scientific and technical consulting, technical essays and 
analyses not concerning construction projects  
15 871 Advertising, information and public relations services 
16 874, 82201-82206 Cleanings of buildings and property management services  
17 88442 Edition and impression services 
18 94 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and analogous services 
Construction services 
1 511 Preparation of the sites and work-sites of construction 
2 512 Construction of buildings 
3 513 Construction of civil works  
4 514 Assembly and construction of prefabricated works 
5 515 Works of specialized businesses of construction 
6 516 Putting installations 
7 517 Secondary work and building finishing 
8 
518 
Housing and credit lease concerning equipments of construction 
or of demolition, personnel works 
 
 
Source: WTO, Committee on Government Procurement; GATS, Central Product Classification 
Note: The table has been translated into English from French  
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